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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's most recent foray into punitive
damages law, Philip Morris v. Williams, held that the Due
Process Clause prohibits a state court from deliberately imposing
a penalty in the form of punitive damages on a defendant for
harms that the defendant inflicted on victims other than the
plaintiff.1 However, the court may still enhance an award to take
into account the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.2
Thus, if the defendant harmed two plaintiffs in the amount of
$100 each, it would violate due process to give one plaintiff $100
in compensatory damages and an additional $100 for the express
purpose of penalizing the defendant for the harm done to the
other victim. But it would not necessarily violate due process if
the state court awarded a punitive judgment as a reflection of the
*

Professor of Law, Boston University. I thank Noemi Kawamoto for research

assistance. For helpful comments I thank Jack Beermann, Jim Fleming, Gary
Lawson, Bill Treanor, David Walker, Ben Zipursky, and participants in faculty
workshops at Fordham University Law School and at Boston University.
1. Philip Morris v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007).
2. Id. at 1063-64.
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reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.
As this brief description suggests, Philip Morris falls short of
providing guidance to lower courts on what to do with punitive
damage awards. Some courts may choose to focus solely on the
reprehensibility approach and continue to award the same
punitive judgments they had been awarding all along, though
now armed with the understanding that justifications for the
judgments should be couched in terms of reprehensibility. Other
courts may avoid handing down any punitive award that looks
like it could be a penalty for victims other than the plaintiff. The
likely result is that the Supreme Court will have to revisit the
issues it attempted to answer in Philip Morris.
The part of Philip Morris most likely to help guide lower
courts is the Court's decision to ground its reasoning in
procedural due process language.3 This is a retreat from the path
of the recent punitive damages decisions based on substantive
due process reasoning.4 Indeed, it may signal a decision on the
part of the Court to back away from a substantive due process
analysis of punitive damages. Such a move would permit lower
courts to better predict the outcomes of future Supreme Court

3. The Court noted that it did not need to consider "whether the
award... at issue [was] 'grossly excessive and therefore considered only "the
Constitution's procedural limitations." Id. at 1063. The Court explained that it
would violate the Constitution's Due Process Clause to instruct the jury that it
may award punitive damages for the injuries of a non-party victim because the
defendant would have no opportunity to defend itself with regard to the nonparty victim. Id. The Court emphasized the need for juries to "ask the right
question" and for "[s]tates [to] avoid procedure that unnecessarily deprives
juries of proper legal guidance" with regard to awarding punitive damages. Id.
at 1064. Presumably, the proper question for juries to ask is the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, and not the harm the defendant
may have caused other victims.
4. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003); BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). I realize that
there is a small controversy over whether the Supreme Court's new case law
should be referred to as having a "substantive due process" component. The
Court has continued all along to use language that suggests that its reasoning
is based on procedural concerns, such as providing notice to potential
defendants. However, it has become a common practice now to refer to these
cases as introducing substantive due process analysis. This is largely because
of the Court's recent references to an excessiveness limit, such as the "singledigit ratio" suggested in State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
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decisions, and by doing so, allow the law on punitive damages to
settle and get out of the Court's orbit.
I will argue here that there is nothing troubling, as a matter
of theory, about the extension of substantive due process
reasoning to the punitive damages cases. Nor should we be
troubled by substantive due process as a general approach
toward the constitutional review of statutes or state court
decisions. The problem in the punitive damages cases is in the
applicationof substantive due process reasoning, which is deeply
flawed.5 To support my argument, I will set out a model of due
process analysis and apply it to the punitive damages issue.
In the model set out below, the function of the Due Process
Clause is to prevent takings through the legislative or common
law process. This view of the Clause's function supports an
expansive approach-i.e., a preference for expanding rather than
contracting the set of entitlements protected by the clause. The
Supreme Court's application of due process reasoning in the
punitive damages case law is in some respects consistent and in
other respects inconsistent with this theory. For the most part,
the Court has failed to develop a set of doctrines that would
enable lower courts to distinguish takings from punishment
consistent with reasonable regulation.
Indeed, the Court's
current analysis appears to restrict a state from levying a
penalty that is optimal on deterrence grounds. This encourages
takings resulting from the intentional disregard of the interests
of potential tort victims by potential tortfeasors. One goal of this
paper is to provide economic guidelines for distinguishing takings
from reasonable regulation through common law rules.
One general guideline suggested below is that if the punitive
award both affects a substantial wealth transfer and is
inconsistent with reasonable regulation, then it is potentially a
taking.
This determination requires some analysis of the
incentive effects created by the award. The mere fact that the

5. I will not argue that the application of due process reasoning is flawed
because of inconsistencies in the case law. For such arguments see Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1049 (2004);
Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines" The Due Process Clause, Punitive
Damages, and CriminalPunishment, 88 MINN. L. REv. 880 (2004).
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punitive award is large, or large in relation to a compensatory
award, is of no importance to the takings analysis in the absence
of some consideration of the deterrence implications of the award.
II. THEORY OF DUE PROCESS
In order to have some sense of the appropriateness of
substantive due process reasoning in the context of punitive
damages, one first needs a somewhat rigorous and general theory
of the objective or function of substantive due process analysis.
To be useful in examining punitive awards, such a theory should
include some economic analysis component. After all, punitive
damages are designed to deter. Economic analysis has been used
since Beccaria6 to understand the relationship between damages
Since little effort has been made in the
and incentives.7
constitutional theory area to use economic reasoning to
understand the function of constitutional provisions,8 here I will
6. See generally CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
(Adolph Caso ed., Int'l Pocket Library 1983) (1775).
7. See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of
Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998).
8. For examples applying economic reasoning to constitutional theory in
various areas of constitutional law, see generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON

TULLOCK,

THE

CALCULUS OF

CONSENT:

LOGICAL

FOUNDATIONS

OF

CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Univ. of Mich. Press 1967) (1962); ROBERT D.
COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION (2000); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 680-83 (Aspen Law & Bus. 5th ed. 1998) (outlining
an economic theory of constitutional protections); Daniel A. Farber, Economic
Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 125 (1992) (providing
an economic analysis of the takings clause); Eugene Kontorovich, The
Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of Constitutional
Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135 (2005) (arguing that liability rules can be found
throughout constitutional law and applying economic analysis to liability rule
remedies); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements
of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L.
REV. 471 (1988); Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic
Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4 (1987); Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and
Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry Into Fundamental Rights and Suspect
Classifications,80 GEO. L.J. 1787 (1992). These books and articles do not apply
economic analysis to the constitutional issues in the punitive damages case law.
For an economic analysis of the constitutional limitations on damages, applied
to pain and suffering awards see Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the
Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 331
(2006).
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do so largely working from the ground up.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment says
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."9 The consensus position
among constitutional theorists today is that this clause should be
understood primarily to set limits on procedure.O The textual
interpretation argument runs roughly as follows: no one is
protected absolutely from being deprived of life, liberty, or
property by the Constitution."1 After all, you can lose your
property as the result of a court judgment or a tax. What the
Constitution prohibits a state from doing is depriving you of your
property or liberty or life without following established and
reasonable procedures.12
In addition to this simple textual analysis, the consensus
position is based on a view that the Court's most notorious foray
into substantive due process, the Lochner case law,13 was a
failure in its most important respects. The consensus view is
that the Lochner cases, which invalidated-on due process
grounds-statutes limiting employer freedom to set wages and
hours, served the primary purpose of protecting wealthy and
powerful industries such as the railroads from regulatory efforts
by state legislatures.14 Some important parts of the New Deal

9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 547-48 (3d. ed.
2006); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83
VA. L. REV. 493, 494 (1997) ("process means procedure, substantive due process
is not just an error but a contradiction in terms") (internal quotations omitted).
Substantive limitations are limited to rights that are regarded as fundamental,
which is understood to be a narrow set of rights largely consisting today of
interests connected to sexual privacy (e.g., contraception, abortion).
11. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
15 (1980).
12. Id. at 19.
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) overruled by Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missuri., 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963).
14. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 135 (1987)
(arguing that the Justices on the Supreme Court "did not hesitate to substitute
judicial opinions for the judgments of elected representatives of the people" and
"Lochnerian decisions flowed partly from the willful defense of wealth and
power");

ROBERT G.

MCCLOSKEY,

AMERICAN

CONSERVATISM

IN THE

AGE OF

349
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labor legislation, and of state level regulation passed at roughly
the same time, could never have been sustained by courts if the
Lochner era case law had remained in effect. In the consensus
view, it would have been harmful to social welfare for the
Lochner case law to remain on the books. Thus, in terms of the
real substance that matters, which is whether legislatures can
enact laws to improve the welfare of citizens, the substantive due
process case law was unhelpful. According to the consensus, it
imposed constraints on the power of voters through their
legislatures to take steps to improve welfare.15
Both the textual and welfare-based arguments against
Lochnerism are unpersuasive. Consider the textual argument
first.
The Due Process Clause, though relatively short, consists of
two commonly examined parts. One is an abstract definition of
the set of protected entitlements: life, liberty, or property. 16 The
second is an abstract definition of the transferprocess by which
those entitlements can be taken by the state: only through due
process of law.17 Thus, the clause consists of both a substantive
and a procedural component. The substantive component is the
general definition of the space of constitutionally protected
entitlements. The procedural component is the description of the
constitutionally acceptable transfer process.
The wording of the Due Process Clause forces courts to
determine whether a particular entitlement is within the set of
protected entitlements and whether the challenged transfer
process is permissible. The first issue is unavoidably a question
of substance. The second is just as clearly a question of
procedure. The claim that the provision is concerned only with
ENTERPRISE 84 (1951) (stating that the Court's philosophy during the Lochner

era contained "an unadorned endorsement of the strong and wealthy at the
expense of the weak and poor."); LAURENCE TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 1345 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that "[many observers have contended that the
Supreme Court's decisions during the Lochner era were motivated by the
majority's conservative economic ideology and by its hostility toward labor
regulation.").
15. David Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41
WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 285-94 (1999).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. Id.
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procedure is difficult to accept as a textual matter. 18
For example, to assert that consensual homosexual sodomy is
not within the set of constitutionally protected endowments, as
the Supreme Court did in Bowers v. Hardwick,19 is to set a
boundary line on the question of substance. In other words,
Bowers is a substantive due process decision because it set a
restriction on the space of protected endowments. Bowers says
very little about procedure, other than that the state, within
limits largely determined by criminal law doctrines, does not
need to worry particularly about the procedures it uses to
regulate homosexual sodomy.20 Just as clearly, Lawrence v.
Texas is a substantive due process decision because it declares
that homosexual sodomy is within the set of constitutionally
protected endowments.21
It would be needlessly restrictive to describe Lawrence as a
substantive due process decision and Bowers as something else.
Any decision defining the scope of constitutionally protected
entitlements is a substantive due process decision, whether it
expands the set or contracts it. However, it appears to have been
the norm among constitutional law specialists to describe only
those decisions that expand the set of constitutionally protected
entitlements as applications of substantive due process theory.

18. For perhaps the most famous statement of the argument that the
clause is concerned only with procedure see ELY, supra note 11, at 18 (stating
that "'substantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green
pastel redness"').
19. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
20. The Supreme Court stated that,
[Bowers] raises no question about the right or propriety of state
legislative decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize homosexual
sodomy, or of state-court decisions invalidating those laws on state
constitutional grounds. The issue presented is whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage
in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still
make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("[Homosexuals'] right to liberty under the
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in [homosexual sodomy]
without intervention of the government.").
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This approach needlessly restricts the definition of substantive
due process because it treats decisions that expand the set of
protected entitlements differently from decisions that either
maintain or contract the set of protected entitlements.
This argument may be clarified through a second example.
Consider a famous criminal law case, In re Winship.22 The
Supreme Court held that proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required in criminal trials under the Due Process Clause.23 Here,
there was an obvious determination that freedom from
deprivation of life or liberty as the result of a criminal conviction
is within the set of constitutionally protected entitlements.24 In
addition, that freedom could be extinguished only if the
prosecutor proved guilt to a high level of probabilistic
satisfaction.25
Following this argument, it would be consistent with the due
process theory to hold that there are some things within the set
of protected entitlements that cannot be taken by the state
irrespective of the procedure. For example, consider the taking
(e.g., imprisonment) of innocent children, either to satisfy the
demands of a legislative majority or as punishment for some
crime. A rational system of constitutional constraints might hold
that such a taking is unconstitutional per se, regardless of the set
of procedures used to govern the taking. The prohibition of
"corruption of blood" as a punishment in the Constitution can be
understood as an illustration of the existence of this boundary
point.26
Put simply, every decision that interprets the Due Process
Clause includes a substantive and procedural component. Every

22. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
23. Id. at 364.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. "The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason,
but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except
during the Life of the Person attainted." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
"'Corruption of blood" was part of a punishment for the crime of treason and
meant that the family of the person accused of committing treason could not
inherit the accused's property. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441
(1965).
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such decision must determine whether the asserted right is
within the set of protected endowments and whether the
challenged procedure by which the right was taken is
constitutionally permissible.
Now consider the consensus argument based on welfare-the
notion that substantive due process theory was used to protect
business interests from state regulation. First, others have
disputed that notion.27 The courts attempted to develop a set of
rules that distinguished wealth transfers from desirable
regulation. 28 The labor statutes struck down in the Lochner case
law often benefited one set of businesses at the expense of
another (e.g., unionized businesses at the expense of nonunionized), so it is misleading to describe the statutes as pitting
business interests against labor interests. Moreover, even if the
welfare-based argument against the early substantive due
process doctrine had not been disputed, it remains an argument
based on assertion rather than empirical proof.29
Second, the substantive due process protection, rather than
being a special gift to businesses, can be explained as based on an
expansive notion of property rights-one that primarily benefited
relatively unskilled workers who were unprotected by unions.
The Lochner notion of property rights holds that a worker's
entitlement to seek a job paying less than a statutory minimum
wage, or requiring more than a certain number of hours, cannot
be taken away by the state without some particularized set of
27. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 74-145 (1985); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC

LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 107-22 (2d ed. 2005); Bernstein, supra note 15,

at 294 (arguing that Lochnerism originated in "judicial commitment to free
labor principles and judicial opposition to class legislation" and not as means of
protecting the wealthy); see generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
RISE
THE
BESIEGED:
JURISPRUDENCE (1993).

AND

DEMISE

OF

LOCHNER

ERA

POLICE

POWERS

28. GILLMAN, supra note 27; Bernstein, supra note 15.
29. A similar charge, governing roughly the same era, is that state courts
adopted the negligence rule in order to subsidize emerging industries.
However, in a review of almost all of the state tort decisions in California and
New Hampshire during the nineteenth century, Gary Schwartz found no
evidence of a bias to protect businesses. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Tort
Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90
YALE L.J. 1717 (1981).
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procedures.30 However, this expansive notion of property rights
should not be viewed as an attempt to protect a certain economic
order or distribution of wealth,31 but as the necessary backdrop
for an active effort to distinguish desirable regulation from
wealth transfers.
I realize that this field of study is so inundated with politics
that it is difficult to make an argument on the basis of economics
without being accused of promoting the interests of some faction.
Still, the argument has to be made. The Lochner era statutes
restricting work hours or fixing minimum pay rates were enacted
as the result of pressure by relatively skilled and unionized
workers.32 The statutes stripped away part of the endowment set
of the less-skilled and nonunion workers. Minimum wages, for
example, reduce the demand for less-skilled employees relative to
skilled employees. At the same time, by making less-skilled
workers less competitive in comparison to union labor, the
statutes help secure union employment. In short, minimum
wage statutes can be understood to operate as indirect takings.
They reduce the value of the potential labor entitlement of lessskilled workers and enhance the wages of the skilled, typically
unionized, workers.
Hence, it is probably incorrect to say that the Lochner era
was bad for overall social welfare. Since the less-skilled tend to
outnumber the highly-skilled, a set of rules that increases the
welfare of the less-skilled relative to the highly-skilled probably
improves the welfare of society overall. This is particularly likely
when the rules encourage competition in a market, permitting
the highly-skilled to differentiate themselves on the basis of
30. The specific language in the Lochner opinion is that "[u]nder [the
Fourteenth Amendment] no state can deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. The right to purchase or to sell labor is
part of the liberty protected by this amendment, unless there are circumstances
which exclude the right." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
31. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987)
(arguing error of Lochner case law was its assumption that the existing wealth
distribution reflected a natural undistorted baseline). For a critique of the
natural order theory of Lochner see David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's
Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003).
32. See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese
Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1999).
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quality rather than price. In addition, to the extent that such
rules encourage skill investment, they enhance the welfare of
both skilled and unskilled workers.
I have argued so far that substantive due process analysis is
an unavoidable component of review under the Due Process
Clause, and that in the expansive mode exemplified by Lochner it
has for the most part been beneficial to social welfare rather than
harmful. This argument is most controversial when used to
expand the set of constitutionally protected entitlements.
However, by expanding the set of protected entitlements, it has
discouraged legislative factions from attempting takings through
the legislative process.
This analysis suggests that the Due Process Clause prevents,
or at least regulates, various types of direct and indirect taking.33
The clause prevents legislative factions from enacting laws that
deprive one group of some entitlement in order to enhance the
wealth of the taking group. 34 It follows under this model that the
clause is designed to warn judges to keep their eyes open for
efforts by group A to expropriate property directly from group B
(direct takings), or indirectly through limiting the rights of or
legal protections to group B in order to enhance the wealth of
group A (indirect takings). Hence, under the Lochner era, courts
used the Due Process Clause to regulate indirect takings by
preventing highly-skilled and unionized workers from stripping
the legal entitlement of the less-skilled to compete by offering
their services at lower wages.
The way to understand the function of the Due Process
Clause then, is to imagine a regime consisting of predatory, or
merely self-interested, legislative factions. They are sitting by
the sidelines, waiting to funnel money into the legislative process

33. For a similar argument about the overall structure of the Constitution,
see generally Macey, supra note 8 (focusing on structure rather than
constitutional doctrine). Lynn Stout's analysis also differs from this paper's
because it supports a narrower scope of fundamental rights than suggested by
this paper's analysis. See generally Stout, supra note 8.
34. For a more expansive discussion of rent-seeking or public choice theory
in connection to constitutional law, see Keith N. Hylton & Vikramiditya
Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of CriminalProcedure, 15 SuP. CT. ECON. REV.
61 (2007).
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to take the things that they want. If they can pay their
legislators $10 and expropriate from some targeted faction a
benefit worth $100, they will do so. The purpose of the Due
Process Clause is to make it difficult for these factions to enter
the legislative game and get what they want. It is not a serious
criticism of this theory of the clause's function to say that it
cannot carry out this function perfectly. There will inevitably be
cases in which a legislative faction hides its real motivations so
well that courts will be unable to cancel or reverse its predatory
grab. However, there will also be many cases in which courts
will be able to identify a naked grab for what it is. In these cases,
the Due Process Clause will serve its purpose. The existence of
this risk raises a barrier to predatory legislative factions.
This suggests that there are both positive and negative
senses in which the Due Process Clause should function. The
positive and negative senses correspond to the notions of direct
and indirect takings. In the positive sense, the clause constrains
predatory factions by prohibiting the enactment of laws that
directly effect a taking. It should also operate in the negative
sense by preventing the enactment of laws that strip parties of
ordinary protections provided by the law. Such laws might be
enacted at the behest of predatory factions so that they can go
directly after their targets and rip them off without having to
worry about the punishments that would ordinarily follow, were
the laws to operate without obstruction.35
The public choice (or rent-seeking) theory of the Due Process
Clause holds that the function of the clause is to authorize courts
to distinguish socially desirable regulation from predatory wealth
transfers.36 This theory may seem close in some respects to John
Hart Ely's democracy-facilitating theory.37 Both theories reflect

35. For an example that might fit in the positive or negative category
depending on the background, see Parsons v. Russell, 11 Mich. 113 (1863). The
court invalidated a law permitting creditors to seize and sell property without
having to prove their claims before a court. Id.at 123.
36. I have suggested that the Lochner case law supports this theory,
though I have not taken the time to present a detailed examination of that case
law. That examination has already been provided by the revisionist literature
on Lochner. See EPSTEIN, supra note 27; GILLMAN, supra note 27.
37. See generally ELY, supra note 11, at 74.
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some degree of mistrust of the democratic process, though Ely's
involves a limited mistrust while the public choice theory's
mistrust is pervasive. However, Ely's theory limits the scope of
the clause's protective function to groups that are unlikely to
form effective legislative factions. From the perspective of rentseeking theory, Ely's limited view of the clause would be too
narrow because it would fail to work as a general deterrent to
predatory governmental action.
The rent-seeking approach may also appear at first to be
equivalent to libertarianism, which supports the most expansive
view of fundamental rights.38 However the approach suggested
here tries to steer away from rights talk. It focuses instead on
the types of expropriation that should be regulated. Rights and
liberties in general are already constrained by the common law of
torts, and the libertarian view would require a skeptical view
toward such constraints. That is not implied by the rent-seeking
theory, which accepts welfare-enhancing regulations. The rentseeking approach, as envisioned here, attempts to distinguish
regulations that enhance social welfare from regulations that
attempt to transfer wealth. While that implies an expansive
approach toward substantive due process doctrine, it does not
imply the maximization of liberty for its own sake.
The expansive approach toward substantive due process
9
reflected in Lochner, Roe, and Lawrence3 is potentially socially
desirable and probably enhances society's welfare. A simple case
can be made that the expansive view of substantive due process,
at the level of defining constitutionally protected entitlements,
increases social welfare. The argument runs as follows: takings
carried out through the legislative process, even the indirect sort
policed by the Lochner case law, are generally indistinguishable
from theft. Theft is bad because it destroys incentives to invest
in productive assets, including human capital, and at the same
time encourages the devotion of effort to the absolutely

38. For a libertarian view of constitutional law see generally, RANDY
BARNETT,

RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY

(2004).
39. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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unproductive effort of taking.
By prohibiting takings, the
substantive due process case law supports productive investment
and provides incentives for welfare-enhancing contracts between
the predatory and target groups.
Consider the example of Lochner to illustrate this argument.
When highly-skilled labor groups obstruct access to the labor
market by low-skilled groups, they shield themselves from
competition and therefore lose some of their incentives to
maintain the skill differential that makes them valuable in the
first place. Second, many low-skilled workers are willing to
accept relatively low wages because they serve as entry points
into the labor market. These workers can start at low wages,
develop skills in low-wage, training-based work, and then move
on to high-wage work later.
By preventing highly-skilled
workers from blocking access to labor markets among the lowskilled, Lochner supported skill investments by both skilled and
unskilled workers.
In addition, the Lochner barrier forced
highly-skilled workers to seek a contractual solution to any
desires they had for exclusive control of a market. With the
Lochner barrier in place, highly-skilled workers could get
exclusive access to a market only by buying out either the less
skilled or the employers who want to hire them. To the extent
that blocking access to the low-skilled may have been efficient,
the contractual solution would permit efficient cases of accessblocking to occur. 40
The issues in Roe and Lawrence are clearly distinguishable
on a number of grounds from those in the Lochner case law. One
way of addressing these distinctions would be to say that the
foregoing argument applies to economic interests only, an
approach that is directly opposed to the law, which applies
expansive substantive due process analysis primarily to sexual
privacy matters. 41 However, that would be a cheap and
40. Alternatively, unionization across a specific labor market could block
access to low-wage workers. If unionization leads to higher quality work, the
result could be one in which no low-wage firm can enter and compete
successfully in the market because of the quality differential. This could be a
case of efficient access-blocking by highly-skilled workers.
41. For an economic approach that tries to justify existing law by
emphasizing privacy interests as fundamental, see Stout, supra note 8.
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The takings analysis that justifies
unsatisfying response.
Lochner still retains some applicability to the sexual privacy
sphere. For example, although the homosexual sodomy right
addressed in Lawrence does not affect wealth-creating
investments, at least as most would understand the term, it does
involve factions that have an interest in enhancing their status
by enforcing conformity with their life-style views. In addition,
the criminalization of consensual homosexual sodomy encourages
investments into the absolutely unproductive activity of
blackmail.
Rather than raise questions about the appropriateness of
expansive substantive due process analysis in the limited context
of sexual privacy, the approach outlined here suggests that it
would be preferable to see it broadened to include the economic
The existing
rights protected in the Lochner case law.
respect to
with
occur
to
predation
legislative
permits
equilibrium
with
predation
that
of
some
economic interests, while blocking
respect to privacy. Social welfare probably would be enhanced if
substantive due process analysis were allowed to serve as a
general barrier to legislative predation.
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND DAMAGES
As commentators have noted, punitive damages case law
represents an odd direction for substantive due process law.42
The other areas of application have involved questions
concerning the scope of the set of protected endowments.
The theory of the function of the Due Process Clause
provided here is that it works to keep predatory factions from
expropriating their targets. It should be clear that this theory
leads to both substantive and procedural restrictions on

Obviously, my approach differs from that of Stout in that Stout refers to her
approach as based upon social choice theory, rather than public choice theory.
See id. The approach taken here is based on public choice theory.
42. See, e.g., Jenny M. Jiang, Comment, Whimsical Punishment: The Vice
of Federal Intervention, Constitutionalization, and Substantive Due Process in
Punitive Damages Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 793, 828 (2006) (arguing that
"substantive due process should not be a right afforded to civil defendants in
the punitive damages arena").
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legislative enactments. We can apply this to damages.43
A. Due Process and the Deprivation Quantum
In order to apply the theory developed in the previous part to
damages, it will be worthwhile to modify it slightly. The theory
set out above points to two key components of the Due Process
Clause: the set of protected entitlements and the transfer
process. In the context of damages, there are three components
to take into consideration: the set of protected entitlements, the
transfer rule or process with respect to those entitlements, and
the deprivation or the deprivation quantum. In the damages
context, the nature of the deprivation is the damage amount
assessed against the defendant.
To draw the connection with constitutional text, the Due
Process Clause (of the Fifth Amendment) says that "no person
shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."44 It follows from the words of the provision that
one can divide the provision into three components: deprivation
quantum, protected entitlements, and transfer process. The
preceding part of this paper limited its analysis to the latter two
components. In this part, I will include the first component.
B. Takings and Damages: A Model
A taking can occur in the naked fashion of stripping a
property or a liberty interest from a certain group. 45 A taking
can also occur by adopting procedures that permit a property or
43. The approach here takes a theoretical account of due process and
applies it to damages. Others have started with an argument that due process
requires a right to a remedy, and have argued from that premise that courts
should not defer to state legislative efforts to restrict tort remedies. See John C.
P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right
to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 529 (2005); Tracy A.
Thomas, Restriction of Tort Remedies and the Constraints of Due Process: The
Right to an Adequate Remedy, 39 AKRON L. REV. 975, 977 (2006). The view
taken in this paper, in contrast to the articles just cited, is that the Due Process
Clause implies constraints on government action. This general constraint
implies rights, of course, but only as a complement to constrained government.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
45. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 27.
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liberty interest to be stripped from some group. 4 6 Yet another
way to arrange a taking is not to modify the set of protected
entitlements, or the rules governing the transfer of those
If a
entitlements, but to alter the deprivation quantum.
predatory group can alter the deprivation quantum so that the
normal rules of law apply as expected until you reach the stage of
penalization, then it could be an effective and difficult-to-identify
method of predation.
The deprivation quantum plays an important role in
regulating conduct. Suppose the potential defendant engages in
an activity from which he gains $1,000 per transaction with a
potential victim, and risks imposing an injury on a victim of $100
per transaction. The potential defendant/injurer can spend $20
in precaution to reduce the likelihood of imposing the $100 injury
in a transaction. Suppose that if the injurer spends $20 in
precaution, the likelihood of the $100 injury falls from 75% to
25%. The value of the risk reduction due to precaution is
therefore $50.47
Suppose the transfer rule imposes strict liability for
unintentional harms, and punitive damages are reserved for a
special class of malicious harms involving intentional injury of
the victim. If the deprivation quantum is set at $100, then it will
provide an incentive for the potential defendant to take care (i.e.,
invest $20 in precaution) to avoid imposing a harm of $100 on a
potential victim. Note that if the injurer does not invest in
precaution, his expected liability in the typical transaction is $75.
If he does invest $20 in precaution, his expected liability is only
$25. He will therefore prefer to spend $20 in order to avoid
paying an additional $50 in liability. Thus, when the deprivation
quantum is set at $100, it provides economically optimal
incentives for care.
Assuming the gain remains $1,000, if the deprivation
quantum is set at $4,000, then it will wipe out all gains to the

46. Id.

47. Moreover, I will assume that the risk imposed on the victim is not
apparent ex ante to the victim. Thus, the victim cannot take the risk into
account in any price he pays for the transaction (if the transaction is a
contract).
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defendant from transactions and discourage his activity. To see
this, suppose the defendant spends $20 in precaution. In this
case, his expected liability is $1,000 when the deprivation
quantum is set at $4,000.48 Since his expected liability ($1,000)
is equal to his gain from the transaction ($1,000), the potential
defendant will have no incentive to engage in the transaction.49
If the deprivation quantum is set at $1, the potential
defendant will take too little care from a welfare perspective,
imposing excessive losses on victims. Knowing that he will only
be held liable for $1 if the victim is injured, the potential
defendant will never invest in precaution and always act in a
manner that imposes a risk of a $100, with likelihood of 75%, on
the victim in each transaction.
In this example, we can see concrete ways in which the
deprivation quantum can be used to effect a taking. If the
deprivation quantum is set at $1, then there is a wealth transfer
The
from the potential victim to the potential defendant.
potential injurer is wealthier, and the potential victim is poorer.
The victim who suffers an injury is obviously poorer because he
receives $1 in damages while he suffers a loss of $100. But
potential victims as a class are worse off because the potential
injurer takes less care in his activity, imposing injuries at a far
greater rate on potential victims. This is the larger and more
important sense in which they are made poorer by a rule capping
their damages at $1.
If the deprivation quantum is set at $4,000 for all injuries,
then the potential injurer will be discouraged from his activity.
This results in a wealth transfer from potential injurers to
potential victims. The injurer who imposes a loss on a victim and
is then forced to pay $4,000 as compensation for an injury, whose
real cost is $100, is clearly poorer than if he were required to pay
exact compensation. However, potential injurers as a class are
poorer because the cost of engaging in their activity is much
higher, discouraging them from the activity. This argument is

48. His expected liability is equal to the probability of an injury to the
victim, 25%, multiplied by the deprivation quantum, $4,000.
49. Technically, he is indifferent as to the transaction. If the deprivation
quantum is set at $4,001, the potential defendant will avoid the transaction.
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also valid if the deprivation quantum is set at any amount above
$100.
The optimal rule imposes a penalty of $100 for the typical
injury and $1,000 (or greater) only if there is evidence of
malicious conduct. Malicious harms involve intentional injury of
the victim-injuries that will occur with a probability of 100%.
In these cases, a penalty of $1,000, which wipes out the gains
from the transaction, should be sufficient as a deterrent.50
A rule setting the penalty at $100 for the typical (nonmalicious) injury and $1,000 for malicious harms gives the
potential injurer appropriate incentives to take care and at the
same time discourages malicious conduct by eliminating the
gains from it.51 The optimal rule does result in wealth transfers;
however, these are of secondary importance to its regulatory
function. The total wealth of society is greater under the optimal
rule than under the alternatives.
There is a clear link between the protected status of
entitlements and the deprivation quantum. If the deprivation
quantum is set too high, it strips away the entitlement of
potential defendants to engage in legitimate activities. If the
deprivation quantum is set too low, it takes away from potential
victims their entitlement to protection under the law from
negligent and malicious (direct and intentional) injuries.
I have referred to positive and negative restrictions, and they
can be illustrated in the damages context. First, consider the
50. I have offered a highly simplified general description of a transaction
that could give rise to a claim for liability for failing to take care or for
intentional harm. A more defensible version of the model probably would allow
the injurer to earn a greater gain for imposing the intentional harm. For
example, suppose the injurer is selling widgets. The injurer/seller can invest in
care in detailing the characteristics of the widget, or he can fraudulently
misstate the risks. If he invests in care, he spends $20, and gets a sales price of
$1,000. He can engage in fraud more cheaply, and earn a sales price of $2,000.
In this description, a minimum penalty of $2,000 would be required to wipe out
the gain from fraud. If the penalty is set at $4,000, it will eliminate the activity
of selling widgets, which is an undesirable outcome. The version of the model in
the text, in which the decision to engage in an intentional tort does not affect
the transaction price, might be appropriate for a case of pure theft, such as the
case where the injurer/seller simply takes the victim/buyer's money without
providing a widget in return.
51. For analysis of incentives and damages, see Hylton, supra note 7.
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positive restriction approach. Suppose a legislature enacts a law
requiring cigarette manufacturers to pay $100 billion in
compensatory damages "for any harm that befalls a smoker
directly attributable to his consumption of cigarettes." This
example demonstrates a taking. If the Supreme Court were to
take a hands-off approach on the theory that states should be
permitted to govern their own legal processes, this would be
inconsistent with the Due Process Clause as envisioned here
because it would permit interest groups to seek statutes that
impose wealth-confiscating penalties on target industries. Since
the purpose of the clause is to obstruct predatory conduct, the
clause requires a reviewing court to strike down such a statute as
unconstitutional. It follows that the Supreme Court's decision to
apply due process reasoning to punitive damages is defensible as
a general matter.
Now, suppose instead of a statute, a state develops through
its common law a rule that in a trial between a smoker and
cigarette manufacturer, the court will determine by flipping a
coin whether the cigarette manufacturer will be required to pay a
compensatory award of $100 billion. Here, it is unclear how a
legislative faction could have convinced the state courts to adopt
such a rule. Still, the rule appears on its face to be so arbitrary
in its punishment that it strongly suggests the backing of a
predatory hand. With such circumstantial evidence of predation,
a court should feel bound by the Due Process Clause to strike
down the state's procedure governing damages in cases involving
cigarette manufacturers.
There is also a negative component to the substantive due
process analysis. Suppose the state enacts a statute that limits
damages to a smoker, in an action against a cigarette
manufacturer, to five cents. Such a damages cap would reduce
incentives on the part of manufacturers to monitor the quality of
their products or to take care in the manufacture and selling
process. This is destructive of individual entitlements to health
and safety because cigarette manufacturers, aside from the
reputation-market constraint, would now be unwilling to spend
more than five cents in order to avoid an injury to a potential
victim.
Alternatively, consider the traffic accident setting. Suppose a
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legislature passes a law that caps damages at $1 for defendants
who own luxury cars. This is a transfer of wealth from people
who do not own luxury cars to people who do. Moreover, it
greatly reduces incentives of luxury car owners to take care,
which diminishes the individual's entitlement to safety and
security. Under the theory of this paper, it is a violation of the
due process requirement. If a state's common law were to arrive
at the same conclusion, it also should be a violation of due
process.
C. Takings and Damages: Pragmatic Considerations
It should be clear that in an attempt to review damages or
penalties on due process grounds it might be difficult for a court
to distinguish an optimal deterrence scheme from a predatory
wealth transfer. A court or legislature might justify an upper or
lower limit on the deprivation quantum by referring to
imperfections in the judicial process that can be cured only by
putting constraints on damage awards. Any effort to use the Due
Process Clause to regulate predation through the deprivation
quantum requires reviewing courts to distinguish desirable
regulation from predation.
Return to some of the earlier examples. A state legislature
passes a statute requiring cigarette manufacturers to pay no less
than $100 billion in damages to a smoker who prevails in
litigation. Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically, suppose
a legislature passes a statute limiting damages in medical
malpractice cases to $500. I have argued that these examples
suggest the backing of predatory hands and should be struck
down on due process grounds, unless some strong evidence exists
to prove that these constraints are part of a socially desirable
regulatory scheme. Let us examine these examples more closely.
In the case of the $500 cap on damages in malpractice cases,
a legislature might justify it on the ground that juries have
tended to be too generous to plaintiffs, and that high tort
judgments discourage physicians from entering the state to
practice. Alternatively, in the case of the $100 billion lower
bound on damages, a legislature might justify it on the ground
that juries have tended to be too stingy to plaintiffs, and it is
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therefore necessary to constrain courts in order to provide
appropriate levels of compensation and deterrence. In both
cases, the proffered justification might appear to be reasonable.
Why, then, would I argue that both examples suggest the backing
of a predatory hand?
The problem in both cases-the $100 billion lower limit and
the $500 upper limit on damages-is that they constrain courts
from adopting reasonable regulatory schemes under tort law. A
$100 billion lower limit on damages effectively would prohibit the
activities subject to the damages awards, while having no impact
Similarly, a $500 upper limit on
on caretaking incentives.
damages would severely reduce caretaking incentives of potential
Unless the state introduced some alternative
defendants.
to control entry and precaution decisions, the
scheme
regulatory
damage constraints in these examples would eviscerate the
regulatory capacity of tort law.
When a constraint on the deprivation quantum has a wealthtransferring effect and at the same time appears to severely
distort or eviscerate the regulatory capacity of existing tort law,
it is appropriate to infer that the constraint serves largely a
wealth-transferring effect. In other words, it is rational to infer
the backing of a predatory hand, or equivalently a taking, when
the deprivation quantum constraint destroys the regulatory
function of the law and enriches one identifiable class of litigants
at the expense of another.
The best that can be done at this stage is to define the legal
inquiry as an effort to determine whether the constraint strongly
suggests the backing of a predatory hand. Obviously, it will be
impossible for reviewing courts to identify every case in which
constraints have been imposed in order to transfer wealth.
However, a rule that at least permits courts to cancel predatory
constraints serves as general deterrent to rent-seeking efforts to
modify the deprivation quantum.
D. Due Process and Recidivist Injurers
Suppose a recidivist injurer takes $100 from each of his
victims. However, only one of every two victims brings a suit.
What is the proper level for the deprivation quantum? If the
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deprivation quantum is set at $100, the recidivist injurer will be
able to keep $100 of every $200 that he takes. He will therefore
find the taking business profitable, and will continue. In order to
protect the entitlements of victims, the deprivation quantum
should be set at $200 for each lawsuit. This amount would
remove the profits from taking. This requires the use of a
multiplier of two applied to the damages for every victim who
wins his lawsuit against the injurer. A multiplier less than two
would result in repeated takings against victims, and would fail
to protect their endowments.
The multiplier has been a central concern of the Supreme
Court's case law on punitive damages. Instead of referring to a
multiplier, however, courts have referred to the ratio of the
punitive to the compensatory award.
BMW required a
reasonable relationship between the punitive and compensatory
award, without suggesting a specific numerical limit.52 State
Farm continued with the general doctrine of BMW, but added in
dicta the claim that a ratio greater than a single-digit should be
considered questionable on constitutional grounds.53 Some courts
have referred to the single-digit ratio statement of State Farm as
if it were a rigid standard in due process law.54

52. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996) ("[W]e are not
prepared to draw a bright line marking the limits of a constitutionally
acceptable punitive damages award.").
53. State Farm Mut. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 ("Our
jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate ... that, in
practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.").
54. See, e.g., Eden Elec. Ltd. v. Amana Co., L.P., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 974
(N.D. Iowa 2003) (the court read State Farm to mean that "even where all the
reprehensible considerations are present, but where compensatory damages are
significant, the punitive damages award cannot ordinarily exceed the 10-to-1
ratio and still be constitutional."). Other courts, though acknowledging that
State Farm declined to impose a bright-line limit as to a constitutionally
acceptable ratio of punitive damages to actual damages, have spoken
approvingly of the single-digit ratio. See, e.g., Envtl. Energy Partners, Inc. v.
Siemens Bldg. Techs., Inc., 178 S.W.3d 691, 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (finding a
ratio 4:1 of punitive damages to compensatory damages to be acceptable, while
implying that a ratio of 19:1 may not be acceptable); Vasquez-Lopez v.
Beneficial Oregon, Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 958 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (approving a ratio
of 1.5:1); Bocci v. Key Pharms., Inc., 76 P.3d 669, 675 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)
(striking down a punitive damages award ratio in excess of 10:1 and stating

CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW

[Volume 2

The single-digit ratio standard of State Farm fails to protect
the endowments of potential victims. Return to my example of
the recidivist injurer and change the assumptions so that he
takes $100 from each victim, and only one victim out of twenty
brings a suit. The proper multiplier is twenty. Setting the
multiplier at a lower level would permit the recidivist injurer to
profit from his activity and guarantee its continuance.
If the single-digit ratio standard had been enacted as a state
statute, it would be questionable on due process grounds because
it would suggest (although weakly) the backing of a predatory
hand. The single-digit ratio standard enacts a soft cap on
damages that transfers wealth from potential plaintiffs to
potential defendants. Moreover, the ratio cap could prevent
damages from serving a desirable regulatory function. The cap
would be no less suggestive of the backing of a predatory hand if
it had been adopted by a state court.
Philip Morris implies that the multiplier in my example of
the recidivist injurer cannot be set above one. 55 The theory
supporting this decision is that every victim should bring his own
claim to court, and the defendant should not be penalized for
harms imposed on victims who are not in court. 56 However, there
are cases in which victims suffer an injury and cannot identify
the injuring parties or the source of the injury.57 The victims

that the court should ask the question "whether there are circumstances
present in this case that would justify a ratio higher than 4 to 1."); Campbell v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 418 (Utah 2004) (concluding that
"a 9-to-1 ratio between compensatory and punitive damages ... serves Utah's
legitimate goals of deterrence and retribution within the limits of due process").
The Vasquez-Lopez court approved an award of 1.53:1 of punitive damages to
potential damages, though the ratio of punitive damages to actual
compensatory damages was much higher. Vasquez-Lopez, 152 P.3d at 958-59.
The court's focus on potential damages seemed designed to bring the ratio
within the single-digit constraint.
55. The Court explains that procedural due process requires that the
defendant have the opportunity to defend against every claim brought against
him, but a defendant has no chance to defend against a non-party victim.
Philip Morris v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007). Therefore, since the
only damages that may be awarded are for the plaintiffs injuries, the multiplier
is one.
56. Id.
57. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
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who cannot identify the injurer or the source of the injury will
never bring suit.
As this example suggests, Philip Morris is a flawed
application of due process doctrine. In order to protect against
the risk of a penalty that is excessive, the Supreme Court held
that any direct attempt to apply a multiplier in recognition of
harms to other victims is a violation of due process.5 8 This
results in an interesting paradox. The decision seems to require
penalties against recidivist injurers to be set at a level that fails
to protect the entitlements of potential victims,59 which suggests
that the decision itself is a violation of due process. It removes
the disincentive from recidivist wrongdoing, and thereby
transfers wealth from potential victims to recidivist injurers.
This is a contradiction of the traditional function of substantive
due process analysis, which has been to offer expansive
protection to entitlements from predatory takings.
Even if Philip Morris were not so deeply flawed, the Court's
decision to apply due process theory to the deprivation quantum
To do so
remains a risky and uncertain undertaking.
in which
instances
consistently, the Court would have to identify
the deprivation quantum is set too high from a social perspective
and also instances in which the deprivation quantum is set too
low from a social perspective. It is a serious indictment of the
Court's reasoning that it has not articulated a theory for
identifying either instance. It is yet another indictment that the
Court has found reasons to worry only in cases in which it thinks
the deprivation quantum is set too high from a social perspective.
However, a taking can just as easily occur through the
deprivation quantum being set too low from a social perspective.
Indeed, the paradox of Philip Morris is that in order to avoid the

Economic Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REV. 869, 888 (1998).
58. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
59. I say that the decision "seems" to impose a strict constraint because it
is not entirely clear that it does. As I noted earlier, Philip Morris permits
courts to increase punitive awards on the basis of reprehensibility, which is a
function of (among other things) the number of real or potential victims of the
defendant's conduct. Id. at 1064. This suggests that a court could apply a
damages multiplier on the basis of harms to victims other than the plaintiff,
and justify the multiplier on the basis of a reprehensibility analysis.

CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW

[Volume 2

case in which the deprivation quantum is set too high, it appears
to require the deprivation quantum to be set too low, which
preserves and enhances the risk of a taking (though in a different
direction than the Court envisioned).
In view of the uncertainties, the Court would be on much
stronger ground if it limited its application of substantive due
process analysis to cases involving the scope of constitutionally
protected entitlements (procedural due process analysis already
governs the transfer process question). In general, substantive
due process appears to be a potentially applicable theory to the
problem of entitlements and to the problem of the deprivation
quantum. However, with respect to the deprivation quantum,
the Court will always find itself on shaky ground. It will be in
the position of second-guessing other courts that have had more
time to consider their own common law rules governing damages
and the appropriateness of applying those rules in specific
cases.6 0 The Supreme Court has no particular advantage in
determining an excessive damage award from one that is optimal
on deterrence grounds. It can identify extreme cases, but damage
levels that are within the range of appropriate damages would
appear to be beyond the Court's expertise to reevaluate. And if a
state court has developed a reasonable set of procedures for
determining punitive awards, it is unlikely that the result of that
procedure will be obviously excessive in light of the relevant
substantive due process concerns.
Alternatively, given that the language of the Due Process
Clause invites an inquiry into the deprivation quantum, the
Court should forge ahead while recognizing the difficulties it
faces in assessing whether a specific deprivation quantum is a
taking rather than a socially desirable penalty. In order to make
such an assessment, a court will have to at least consider the
incentives created by the deprivation quantum. 61 Perhaps by
adopting the approach suggested in the previous part of this
paper, in which the Court would look for instances in which the

60. Consider for example, Justice Breyer's second-guessing of the Green Oil
Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1989) factors. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, Inc.,
517 U.S. 559, 589-93 (Breyer, J., concurring).
61. See Hylton, supra note 7.
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quantum determination strongly suggests the backing of a
predatory hand, it can distinguish takings from socially desirable
penalties. However, the creation of simplistic axioms, such as
the Philip Morris proposition that it is wrong to increase
damages to A in order to reflect harms to B,62 falls far short of
providing a serious analysis of the welfare implications of a
particular approach to determining the deprivation quantum.
As I noted before, the Philip Morris opinion uses the
language of procedural due process in a manner that suggests a
retreat from the path of recent decisions applying substantive
due process analysis to punitive damages. The use of procedural
due process language is arguably reassuring in the sense that it
may signal a retreat to the procedural due process approach.63
However, the use of procedural due process language in Philip
Morris was somewhat inappropriate and at worst insincere.
After all, Philip Morris puts a weak substantive limit on the
deprivation quantum. It holds that the deprivation quantum
should not be deliberately designed to include a component that
reflects a penalty for harms done to victims other than the
plaintiff.64 That message has nothing to do with procedural due
process; it is a substantive limit on the deprivation quantum. Of
course, it is a weak substantive limit, because Philip Morris
permits courts to evade that limit by focusing entirely on
reprehensibility as a basis for awarding punitive damages. But
it is a substantive limit nonetheless and in that respect it is
incorrect to suggest that it is entirely a function of procedural
concerns.

62. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
63. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991). In particular,
the Court states that,
every state and federal court that has considered the question has
ruled that the common-law method for assessing punitive damages
does not in itself violate due process.... In view of this consistent
history, we cannot say that the common-law method for assessing
punitive damages is so inherently unfair as to deny due process and
be per se unconstitutional.
Id.
64. See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
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E. Due Process and Class Actions
In the case in which the recidivist injurer takes $100 from
each victim and only one victim out of twenty brings suit, a class
action would be the obvious alternative to a single lawsuit
resulting in a multiplier of twenty. A lawsuit brought by a class
of twenty or a single lawsuit resulting in a total award of $2,000
would accomplish the same deterrence objective.
Both
approaches would uphold the law's efforts to protect the
endowments of potential victims from systematic predation.
The rationale of Philip Morris, stretched to its logical
endpoint, implies that the class action device is impermissible on
constitutional grounds. Philip Morris stresses the defendant's
entitlement on due process grounds to mount a defense against
every individual claim for punishment.65 Although the Court did
not say that class actions are unconstitutional, the rationale of
Philip Morris will be used by defendants to contest class
certification.
Clearly, it is possible for the class action device to be used as
a form of predation against potential defendants. It is also
possible for restrictions on the device to be used to support
private predation by disarming potential victims of an effective
tort remedy. Due process reasoning should be used to prevent
both types of predation.
In the class action setting, the key method of predation
against potential defendants involves the formation of classes
that effectively bundle claims that have insufficient legal merit to
result in any punishment against the defendant. It is easy to see
the ways this can occur.
The plaintiff class may include
individuals who suffered no injury at all, or whose injuries are
not due to the defendant's conduct. A system of procedural rules
that permits litigation classes that bundle such fictitious claims
would
enable
predation
against
potential
defendants.
Conversely, a system of procedural rules that prohibits the
formation of valid classes, or the use of punitive multipliers to
bring about socially desirable deterrence, would enable predation
by potential defendants.
65. Id.
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Due process reasoning should not be used to eliminate class
actions but to regulate the class action device in order to prevent
predation either by plaintiffs or by potential defendants. The
requirement of commonality among claims in class actions is an
In
important method of preventing abusive class actions.66
the
on
formed
being
general, the goal should be to prevent classes
basis of heterogeneous claims and to prevent redundant
penalization.67 Rules that serve this function in the class action
context should be imported to the punitive damages case law to
ensure that plaintiffs cannot use the punitive damages lawsuit to
achieve objectives that are barred under the rules governing
class actions. This implies that if a court were to hold that a
proposed class is inappropriate for certification, a punitive
damages claim based on the same hypothetical class should also
be rejected.
IV. CONCLUSION
What I have tried to do in this paper is develop an economic
theory of the function of the Due Process Clause and to use that
theory to understand the relationship between due process
There are three key concerns
concerns and civil damages.
generated by the Due Process Clause: the scope of protected
entitlements, the transfer rules governing those entitlements,
and the deprivation quantum. Substantive due process analysis
applies to the question of entitlements and to the deprivation
The transfer rules are obviously a matter of
quantum.
procedural due process.
In general, one can distinguish between expansive and
contractive substantive due process analysis. The expansive
approach is preferable because it blocks predatory legislative
grabs, which appears to be consistent with the Lochner case law.
The expansive versus contractive distinction is less useful in the
66. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
67. See generally Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip
Morris v. Williams, REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2008) (Boston Univ. School of Law
Working Paper Series, Law & Econ., Paper No. 07-06, 2007), available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/HYltonKO
40207_OOO.pdf.
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context of the deprivation quantum because this is really a
matter of increasing or reducing a penalty. Increasing it benefits
those whom the penalty is designed to protect; lowering it
benefits those the penalty is designed to regulate. Still, in many
cases there will be an optimal penalty, or range of penalties, that
is best from society's point of view, because it protects potential
victims without over-deterring potential injurers.
Any
application of due process analysis that prevents a state from
levying an optimal penalty is harmful to society's welfare.
The theory developed here suggests that substantive due
process analysis is quite difficult to apply with any degree of
accuracy and consistency to the deprivation quantum. Courts
probably would do best to reserve substantive due process
analysis to determination of the scope of protected entitlements.
Alternatively, courts should be prepared to consider the incentive
effects created by the deprivation quantum, in order to
distinguish takings from punishment consistent with reasonable
regulation.
On the assumption that courts will continue to apply due
process reasoning to the deprivation quantum, this paper has
suggested guidelines for distinguishing predation from
reasonable regulation in the context of punitive damages. One
general guideline is that if the punitive award both effects a
substantial wealth transfer and is inconsistent with reasonable
regulation, then it is potentially a taking. However, the mere
fact that the punitive award is large, or a multiple-digit ratio of a
compensatory award, or could be interpreted as internalizing
harms suffered by non-plaintiffs, is of no importance in a takings
analysis in the absence of some consideration of the incentive
effects created by the award.

